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Administrative Law-
EFFECT OF MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE DOCTRINE
ON ADMINISTRATIVE BOARD PROCEDURE
The Civil Aeronautics Board ordered a hearing on an application by
Capital Airlines for a non-stop route between Cleveland and New York.
At the time of the order the Board had on file applications by American
Airlines and Northwest Airlines for the identical service. Only American
moved to have its application consolidated in the proceeding and the motion
was granted. At the hearing Northwest appeared as a party for another
purpose.1  The examiner, in his report, recommended that only Capital's
application be granted. Northwest took exceptions to this report on the
ground that its mutually exclusive application for the route had not been
considered. The Board upheld the report of the examiner. The court of
appeals reversed, holding that the Board must comparatively consider all
mutually exclusive applications 2 in its file before granting any, even though
the complaining applicant, who was present and a party at the examiner's
hearing, had made no request for consolidation until after the examiner's
report.3 Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
The basis of the "mutually exclusive" doctrine announced by the
Supreme Court in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC is that ". . . where
two bona fide applications are mutually exclusive the grant of one without
a hearing on both deprives the loser of the opportunity [for hearing] which
Congress chose to give him." 4 Applications are mutually exclusive when
the number on file before an administrative licensing agency exceeds the
available licenses, with the obvious result that one or more of the applica-
tions must be denied.5 In construing the requirements of the Ashbacker
1. A separate application of Northwest for the removal of a restriction, re-
quiring that all flights east of Milwaukee originate or terminate at or west of
Minneapolis-St. Paul, had been consolidated in the hearing. Instant case at 341.
2. The court held that the present applications were mutually exclusive since at
the time of the final Board order economic conditions were such that no additional
licenses would be issued. Instant case at 344.
3. Northwest never made a formal motion to consolidate. In addition to the
exceptions to the examiner's report a request for consolidation was made orally
before the Board. Instant case at 342.
4. 326 U.S. 327, 333 (1945). The Communications Act provides, inter alia:
. In event the Commission . . . [decides to deny the application], it shall
notify the applicant thereof, . . . and shall afford such applicant an opportunity
to be heard under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe." 48 STAT. 1085
(1934), 47 U.S.C. §309(a)(1947).
The Civil Aeronautics Act stipulates that an application for a certificate
shall be set for public hearing ... " 52 STAT. 987 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 481(c)
(1947).
5. See Radio Cincinnati v. FCC, 177 F.2d 92, 94 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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doctrine in subsequent cases, the courts have defined at least two areas
of permissible administrative discretion. First, the agency may determine
whether the mutually exclusive applications will be heard together or
separately. Thus, it need not consolidate into one hearing all mutually
exclusive applications,6 and it may grant in one order two such applica-
tions heard separately, 7 as long as it appears that the applications were com-
paratively considered by the agency. This administrative discretion is
further promoted by the holding that before an applicant may seek judicial
review, his chances of getting a license must be finally precluded by an
agency order.8 The result in one case was to allow the Federal Com-
munications Commission in a mutually exclusive proceeding to remove
from consideration one application and one available license, pending de-
termination of that applicant's eligibility.9 The probability that one of
the others would obtain a license was held insufficiently diminished to
warrant appeal.10 A second area of administrative discretion in the Ash-
backer situation lies in the agency's power to determine the scope of a
particular proceeding. For example, when the CAB decided to consider
the reallocation of trans-atlantic routes among the already licensed oper-
ators, it was not required to consider comparatively the mutually exclu-
sive application of an unlicensed airline.1' Furthermore, when the same
board refused to consolidate an application for trunk line service into a
local area route proceeding, the court approved the limited hearing, even
though there was some overlapping among the requests.'2 Thus, the
recent developments on the doctrine indicate judicial latitude in the inter-
est of orderly administrative procedure.' 3
The instant case raises additional problems as to agency discretion with-
in the Ashbacker doctrine: first, the effect of a mutually exclusive applicant's
failure to move for consolidation until after hearing, and second, the power
of an agency to require timely motion to consolidate. The only prior deci-
sions concerning a time limit declared that applications filed subsequent
to a final agency order do not become mutually exclusive to those already
granted.' 4 But, assuming mutual exclusiveness, may an applicant's right
6. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950).
7. United States v. Pierce, 327 U.S. 515 (1946) (ICC proceeding; Ashbacker
not cited).
8. Western Air Lines v. CAB, 184 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1950); Eastern Airlines
v. CAB, 178 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
9. Pauly v. FCC, 181 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
10. Id. at 293.
11. Seaboard & Western Airlines v. CAB, 181 F.2d 777 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
12. See Eastern Airlines v. CAB, 178 F.2d 726, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1949); ef.
CAB v. State Airlines, 338 U.S. 572 (1950) (Where Board undertook to hold
an area proceeding, it could license an applicant to a route for which he had not
applied without infringing on the rights of the declared applicants for that route).
13. But cf. American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(Agency cannot grant, except in emergency, temporary license with hearings limited
to summary procedure, where such license is mutually exclusive to an existing one).
14. KFAB Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 177 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Radio
Cincinnati v. FCC, 177 F.2d 92 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
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to a comparative hearing be lost or extinguished through a failure to make
timely motion to consolidate? The present court in placing no time limita-
tion on the right to move for consolidation provides an answer of dubious
merit. The burden is now placed on the Board to guarantee the finality
of its hearings by thoroughly searching its files for all applications mutually
exclusive to the one under consideration. 15 Should one application be over-
looked,16 a mere informal motion would cause a proceeding in its final
stages to revert to pre-hearing conference. The resulting opportunity for
harassment and deferred decision may lead operators to fill agency dockets
with applications for every conceivable facility. In an attempt to retain
orderliness in its proceedings, the CAB has already promulgated rules 1
7
which require that motions for consolidation be filed not later than the date
of the pre-hearing conference and that subsequent motions be granted
only on a showing of good cause.' 8  These rules would seem to be the
most effective means of avoiding the confusion inherent in the present
holding. The language of the instant case may be read to suggest that the
Board's remedial ruling is inconsistent with the statutory hearing require-
ments; but the case on its facts is one where there was no notice of a time
limitation on the right to consolidate. Now that a reasonable regulation
serves that notice, the case is readily distinguishable.
Administrative Law-
GOOD CAUSE PROVISO IN UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION STATUTE HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELEGATION
Sixteen married women were discharged from their positions with the
relator pursuant to a union contract, and were granted benefits by the
Indiana Unemployment Security Review Board.' The Indiana Unemploy-
ment Security Act specifically provided that no benefit rights should accrue
15. The CAB asserts that the search required by the instant holding would
necessitate ". . . a substantial staff performing no other function." CAB release,
Rules of Practice in Economic Proceedings 3, (August 11, 1952).
16. ". . . During the past several years the Board on the average has disposed
of between 400 and 450 proceedings out of an average of some 1400-1500 applications
on file." Ibid.
17. The Civil Aeronautics Act provides that "... the Board is empowered
. . . to make and amend such special rules, regulations, and procedure, pursuant
to and consistent with the provisions of this chapter...." 52 STAT. 984 (1938),
49 U.S.C. § 425 (1947).
18. Modification of 14 C.F.R. § 302.12 (Supp. 1952) contained in CAB release,
m.pra note 15, at 5, § 302.12(b). The present FCC regulations contain no provision
concerning the timeliness of motions to consolidate. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.724(a), (b)
(1949).
1. The contract provided that any woman who married should leave the
services of the employer within thirty days of her marriage. The Board, in grant-
ing benefits, held that because the provision was contrary to public policy, the
leaving was not voluntary.
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to an individual who voluntarily left work to marry, but allowed a referee
to waive or modify such denial "upon good cause shown." 2 On appeal
the court held that marriage with knowledge of the terms of the union
agreement was constructively a voluntary leaving of employment, and
reversed the grant of benefits.8 The relator unsuccessfully sought a writ
of prohibition to prevent further proceedings. On appeal from this deci-
sion the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed, holding that the "good cause"
exception involved an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, be-
cause it prescribed no standards to assist the Review Board in the deter-
mination of what was good cause. State ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Review
Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., 101 N.E.2d 60 (Indiana
1951).
This decision, on its face, appears to be one of broad effect since good
cause provisions are contained, in one form or another, in all but one of the
state unemployment compensation statutes, and heretofore none have been
invalidated as unconstitutional delegations.4 The usual formulation re-
garding delegations of legislative power is to the effect that delegation will
be permitted if there is a sufficient standard to guide the administrator in
handling individual cases which arise under the particular act in question.
This requirement of a standard is satisfied if there is contained in the delega-
tion, either expressly or implicitly, the broad policy to be effected. 5 The
administrative agent is allowed discretion to operate within the area de-
lineated by this policy. It is on the inadequacy of the standard that the
potential impact of the decision in the instant case can be lessened.
The overall policy of the Unemployment Compensation statutes is to
alleviate the economic hardship which results from an involuntary loss of
work. Most statutes, then, limit or refuse benefits for voluntary leaving,
but allow an exception for good cause. Good cause in this area presumably
would comprise those considerations which would justify one with a
genuine desire for work in leaving his employment. The Indiana statute
has such a general disqualification for voluntary leaving 6 in addition to the
specific disqualification for leaving to assume marital obligations. The
general disqualification provides for a loss of benefits for six weeks; the
2. ". . . no benefit rights shall accrue to any individual based upon wages
earned from any employer prior to the day upon which: (a) Such individual left
work voluntarily to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, or other domestic
obligations: Provided, however, that a referee or the review board . . . , may,
upon good cause shown, waive or modify such denial of benefits for such reasons."
IND. ANN. STAT. §52-1539f (Bums 1951).
3. Standard Oil Co. V. Indiana Employment Security Division, 119 Ind. App.
576, 88 N.E.2d 567 (1949).
4. Bureau of Employment Security, ComPAlusoN OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT
INsURANcE LAWs 77 (1952).
5. See Jaffe, An Essay of Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 CoL. L. REV.
561 (1947); Albert v. Milk Control Board of Ind., 210 Ind. 283, 200 N.E. 688
(1936).
6. "An individual shall be ineligible for waiting period or benefit rights: For the
week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause . . , and for the
five next following weeks, in addition to the waiting period." IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 52-1539b (Bums 1951).
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specific marital disqualification provides for a total loss of benefits. It is
because Indiana has both these provisions that the policy considerations
which might give meaning to the good cause exception in the more severe
marital disqualification are difficult to discover. Presumably they are not
the same considerations involved in the good cause exception or the general
disqualification, for this would make the marital disqualification needless
repetition in the statute.7 Other possible policy bases for the special
marital disqualification with its good cause exception fail on the same
ground. The fact that married women are usually not available for work
is one such possibility. However, another section of the same Act re-
quires a showing of availability, again making the special marital provision
repetitious.8 All in all the policy considerations in enacting this special
marital disqualification are uncertain at best. If this be so, then the instant
case does not stand for the proposition that "good cause" is not a sufficient
standard and that therefore the forty-six other statutes are possibly defec-
tive. It does stand as a caution to draftsmen, indicating that there are no
magic verbal formulae 9 which will substitute for a careful analysis of why
the legislation is being passed and what the administrator is to do with that
legislation.
Insurance-
NO MORTGAGEE INTEREST UNDER THE "STANDARD
MORTGAGEE CLAUSE" WHERE NOTE SECURED
IS INVALID
A real estate corporation executed what was in form a promissory
note, but signed "without recourse to maker." The amount of the note was
secured by a deed of trust ' on certain realty. On the same day the cor-
poration sold this property "subject to" the deed of trust for the difference
between the agreed value of the property and the amount of the note. The
defendant insurance company issued a fire insurance policy on the premises
7. In addition to this repetition, the imposition of a greater penalty for voluntary
leaving for less compelling reasons appears irreconcilable with the concept of a
genuine desire to work, determinative of good cause in § 52-1539.
8. However it is possible that the frequency with which family obligations caused
unemployment created by its volume a greater problem than the ordinary leaving
of work without good cause. If this is true, and if only in cases involving ex-
ceptionally pressing family obligations did the legislature intend that benefits be
granted, good cause would relate as in §52-1539 to the social acceptability
of the reason for leaving. The existence of this alternative policy further illustrates
the ambiguity of the section and lends support to the decision.
9. Even a phrase so widely used as "upon good cause shown."
1. A deed of trust or trust deed mortgage ". . . consists of a conveyance to a
person (who usually is a third person but may be the creditor) on trust to hold the
property as security for the payment of debt. . . ." OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 36
(1951). It is essentially a mortgage. For most purposes, and for all purposes
relevant to this comment, it can be regarded as such. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY
§ 1400 (3d ed. 1939).
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to the purchaser, with loss if any, payable to the trustees in the deed of
trust and to the purchaser, as their interests should appear. Included in
the policy was the "standard mortgagee clause" 2 which provides, in part,
that if the insurance company shall deny liability for any fire loss as to the
mortgagor or owner, it shall to the extent of payment to the mortgagee, or
trustee, be subrogated to all his rights of recovery or it may pay off the
mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage.3
The purchaser later sold the property "subject to" the deed of trust with-
out assigning the policy, thus making the insurance company, in case of
fire loss, liable only to the trustees. The property was then damaged by
fire and the trustees sued on the policy, recovering a judgment against
the insurance company. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
note was invalid, that therefore there was no mortgage debt and no mort-
gagee's rights of recovery to which the insurance company could be sub-
rogated, and that consequently the trustees did not have a mortgagee's or
trustee's "interest" within the meaning of the insurance policy. Standard
Fire Insurance Co. v. Fuller, 195 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
The generally stated rule is that a mortgage cannot exist without an
independent debt or obligation which it secures and that if the debt or
obligation is unenforceable, the mortgage is likewise unenforceable. 4 While
this rule is soundly applied where the intention was that the mortgage
should secure an independent obligation which has become unenforceable
for lack or failure of consideration, the mere absence of an enforceable debt
does not necessarily make a mortgage unenforceable. For example, a mort-
gage has been held valid where enforcement of the personal liability of the
mortgagor on the debt has been barred by the statute of limitations 5 or by
a discharge in bankruptcy proceedings. 6 Likewise, mortgages can be fore-
closed though given to secure the note of a married woman, void because
2. "Loss or damage, if any, under this policy, shall be payable to the aforesaid
as mortgagee (or trustee) as interest may appear, and this insurance as to the
interest of the mortgagee (or trustee) only therein, shall not be invalidated by any
act or neglect of the mortgagor or owner of the within described property, nor by
any foreclosure or other proceedings or notice of sale relating to the property, nor
by any change in the title or ownership of the property, nor by the occupation of the
premises for purposes more hazardous than are permitted by this policy. . ...
3. "Whenever this company shall pay the mortgagee (or trustee) any sum for
loss or damage under this policy and shall claim that, as to the mortgagor or owner,
no liability therefor existed, this company shall, to the extent of such payment, be
thereupon legally subrogated to all the rights of the party to whom such payment
shall be made, under all securities held as collateral to the mortgage debt, or may at
its option pay to the mortgagee (or trustee) the whole principal due or to grow
due on the mortgage with interest, and shall thereupon receive a full assignment
and transfer of the mortgage and of all such other securities. .. ."
4. Coon v. Shry, 209 Cal. 612, 289 Pac. 815 (1930); Tyler v. Wright, 122
Me. 558, 119 Atl. 583 (1923); Perkins et al. v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N.J. Eq.
723, 61 Atl. 167 (Ch. 1905), aff'd nern, 71 N.J. Eq. 304, 71 Atl. 1135 (Ch. 1906).
5. Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N.Y. 295, 28 N.E. 638 (1891); Demai v. Tart, 221
N.C. 106, 19 S.E.2d 130 (1942) ; First National Bank of Madison, Wis. v. Kolbeck,
247 Wis. 462, 19 N.W.2d 908 (1945).
6. Bush v. Cooper, 18 How. 82 (U.S. 1855) ; Begein v. Brehm, 123 Ind. 160,
23 N.E. 496 (1890).
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of the maker's coverture,7 or to secure a note or bond which has been
voided by alteration.8 Similarly, the validity of a mortgage given to secure
payment of a note has been upheld although the note provides that the
maker shall not be personally liable thereon.9 In such a case the creditor
relies solely on his right to proceed against the land. And finally, the
courts have given effect to mortgages where there was no independent
obligation of the mortgagor to be secured. Those cases recognizing mort-
gages created by way of gift l or given to secure the debt of another"
are clear examples. They indicate a capacity in a landowner, where he so
intends, to create an interest or "real debt" in his land by way of mortgage
independent of any collateral debt or obligation and without personal
liability.
In the present case, there was no independent indebtedness. Yet it
seems clear that there was an intention to give to the payee or holder of
the "note" an interest in. the property by way of the deed of trust
and to subject the land to a debt, measured by the amount of the note.
The words "without recourse to maker" indicate an intention that there
was to be no personal obligation on the note. In view of the fact that the
payee was a "straw man" for the owner of the property and that the pur-
chaser paid only $500, with the deed of trust the sole means of securing
to the owner the $10,500 balance, it is apparent that the intention was to
create a mortgage interest.
The court's action in striking down the deed of trust, and thereby
denying to the trustees the benefit of the insurance protection on which they
had relied, was neither necessary nor desirable.' Effect should have been
given to the intended economic purpose of the transaction under the cases
discussed above, which recognize the capacity of a landowner to create
a debt in his land, by way of mortgage, independent of any collateral or
personal obligation, where the intention to do so is present. Another ap-
proach would have been to hold that the insurer could not question the
validity of the mortgage, as was done by the Missouri court in a suit by
7. Gregory v. Van Voorst, 85 Ind. 108 (1882) ; cf. United States Savings
Fund & Investment Co. v. Harris, 142 Ind. 226, 40 N.E. 1072, rehearing denied,
142 Ind. 226, 41 N.E. 451 (1895) (a mortgage given to secure a note which was
disaffirmed by the maker, an infant femme covert, without returning the consideration,
was held enforceable).
8. Cheek v. Nall, 112 N.C. 370, 17 S.E. 80 (1893) ; Smith v. Smith, 27 S.C. 166,
3 S.E. 78 (1887) ; Fowler v. Barlow et ux., 102 Vt. 99, 146 Atl. 77 (1929).
9. Seieroe v. First National Bank of Kearney, 50 Neb. 612, 70 N.W. 220
(1897) ; cf. Wells v. Flynn, 191 Iowa 1322, 184 N.W. 389 (1921) (sales contract
provided that there would be no personal liability) ; Pearson v. Mulloney et al., 289
Mass. 508, 194 N.E. 458 (1935); Cook v. Johnson, 165 Mass. 245, 43 N.E. 96
(1896); Birkenfeld v. Cocalis et al., 129 N.J.L. 382, 29 A.2d 902 (1943) (sales
contract provided that there would be no personal liability).
10. Goethe v. Gmelin, 256 Mich. 112, 239 N.W. 347 (1931) ; Cooklin v. Cooklin,
260 Mich. 69, 244 N.W. 232 (1932); see Campbell v. Tompkins, 32 N.J. Eq. 170,
172 (Ch. 1880). Contra: Coon v. Shry, 209 Cal. 612, 289 Pac. 815 (1930).
11. Garretson Inv. Co. v. Arndt, 144 Cal. 64, 77 Pac. 770 (1904); Perkins
v. Trinity Realty Co., 69 N.J. Eq. 723, 61 AtI. 167, (Ch. 1905), aff'd ien., 71
N.J. Eq. 304, 71 Ati. 1135 (Ch. 1906); Herron v. Stevenson et al., 259 Pa. 354,
102 Atl. 1049 (1918).
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mortgagee against insurance company under the ordinary "loss payable"
clause.' 2 Such an approach would avoid the question left open by the
present decision of the extent to which an insurance company will be al-
lowed to litigate a mortgagor's defenses to the mortgage before it is re-
quired to pay under "the standard mortgagee clause." The danger of
permitting the insurance company to test the validity of the mortgage is
that it may subject the mortgagee to the legal expenses of two suits in
defending his mortgage-one against the insurance company, and if he
loses, one against the mortgagor at foreclosure-with the possibility of
having it declared invalid in one and valid in the other.
Moreover, on the facts of the present case, where there was a pur-
chase subject to the deed of trust, the requirements of the mortgagee
clause could have been satisfied by requiring the insurance company to
accept an assignment of the deed of trust (or subrogation thereunder to the
extent of payment). The insurance company could then have sold the
premises at public auction ("foreclosed" in mortgage terminology) Is and
recouped whatever value was left in the property. This would have given
the trustees the insurance protection which they had sought and would have
placed the fire loss on the party who had been compensated for taking it.
The court's present decision allows the insurance company to raise a
defense to the deed of trust that would have been unavailable to the person
holding subject thereto, for it has been frequently held that, where the
amount of a mortgage has been deducted from the agreed value, a pur-
chaser subject thereto cannot question its validity.1 4 In addition, it seems
highly doubtful that the premiums charged for this policy could have been
calculated on any sound probability of full recovery through subrogation
when it is realized that the right to subrogation arose only because of a
fortuitous change in the ownership of the property.15 Indeed, the insurance
company here would have been in no worse a position than if it found
that the mortgage expressly denied any personal liability on the part of
the mortgagor or if its claim was against a party personally liable but
insolvent.
12. Rowland v. Boston Insurance Co., 277 Mo. App. 597, 55 S.W.2d 1011
(1932).
13. Brogoitti v. Walter, 43 Ariz. 290, 30 P.2d 835 (1934) (an insurer who has
paid off mortgage debt to mortgagee who was protected under the standard mort-
gagee clause can foreclose mortgage against remote grantee who took subject to the
mortgage); see also, American Insurance Co. v. Combs, 293 Ky. 121, 168 S.W.2d
545 (1943) ; Insurance Co. of North America v. Martin, 151 Ind. 209, 51 N.E. 361
(1898).
14. See, e.g., Freeman v. Auld, 44 N.Y. 50 (1870) (mortgagor's grantee not
allowed to question the consideration for the mortgage) ; Crawford v. Nimmons, 180
Ill. 143, 54 N.E. 209 (1899); Scull v. Idler, 79 NJ. Eq. 466, 81 At]. 746 (Ch.
1911) (grantee not allowed to raise defense of usury); United States Bond &
Mortgage Co. v. Keahey et al., 53 Okla. 176, 155 Pac. 557 (1916) ; see also Tortora
v. Malve Realty & Construction Corp., 96 N.Y.S.2d 388 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
15. This seems to be borne out by the fact that the premiums charged for fire
insurance are the same whether or not the "standard mortgagee clause" is attached
to the policy. Of course, subrogation recovery by the insurance company will have
an effect on future rates to the extent that it reduces the company's loss experience.
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International Law-
DEFENSIVE INTERPLEADER ALLOWED
AGAINST SOVEREIGN PLAINTIFF
Nationalist China and the Directorate General of its Postal and Sav-
ings Bank brought an action against the American Express Company
to recover a deposit made in the name of the postal bank, which was pay-
able on demand. The defendant filed a counterclaim for interpleader 1
against the "Central People's Government of the People's Republic of
China", Su Yu-nung (chief postal official of that government) and others,
alleging their assertion of a claim to the fund, defendant's willingness to
pay the credit balance to the persons entitled thereto, and defendant's re-
fusal to pay the plaintiffs or anyone else without reasonable assurances
that such payment would discharge its obligations and not subject it to
multiple liability. The United States district court 2 granted a motion
for interpleader and ordered defendant discharged from liability upon
paying the money into court. On appeal the court of appeals affirmed
and remanded the case for a determination of the status of the interpleaded
parties. Republic of China v. Anerican Express Co., 195 F.2d 230 (2d
Cir. 1952).
A foreign sovereign, unless it consents, cannot be sued in the courts
of another sovereign.3 However, when the sovereign begins suit this
immunity is waived to the extent that setoffs and counterclaims are
available in the way of defense,4 since to do otherwise would be manifestly
unjust.5 Generally, the counterclaims are limited to the same transac-
tion as that upon which the sovereign's action is based, and to an amount
sufficient to counteract its claim.6 To minimize "international discord and
complications," ' affirmative judgments are not usually rendered against
foreign sovereigns.8 By voluntarily appearing in the role of suitor, the
sovereign abandons its immunity from suit and subjects itself to the pro-
cedure and rules of decision governing the forum which it has sought,9
1. FE. R. Civ. P. 22(1).
2. Republic of China v. American Express Co., 95 F. Supp. 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
3. Puente v. Spanish Nat. State, 116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 627 (1941).
4. The Gloria, 286 Fed. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
5 See Codification of International Law, 26 Am. J. INr'L L. Supp. 509 (1932).
6. United States v. New York Trust Co., 75 F. Supp. 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
7. See Kacedan, The Right to Recover from a Foreign Sovereign by way of
Set-off, 13 B.U.L. REv. 447, 461 (1933).
8. People v. Dennison, 84 N.Y. 272, 280 (1881) and cases cited therein. Contra:
Dexter & Carpenter v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930),
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931) (affirmative judgment rendered against a foreign
sovereign, the court stating that "It is hoped that the judgment of our courts will be
respected and payment made by the Swedish Government.") (italics supplied).
9. See Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134
(1938).
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much as individuals are required to submit.10
Dictum in an earlier case indicated that a sovereign, by bringing suit,
did not consent to suits by third parties through the device of interpleader.
"If this be not so," the court stated, "the immunity can be frittered
away either by interpleader or attachment in any case where a foreign
sovereign undertakes to collect a debt owed it." 11 That decision, how-
ever, rested primarily on the ground that there was no reasonable basis
for interpleader, even between private persons, expressly calling attention
to the fact that there had been no actual deposit of funds or securities, but
merely a credit which had been opened through foreign bankers.
There seems to be no adequate reason to deny, because of the plain-
tiff's sovereign immunity, defensive interpleader where otherwise per-
missible. When the complainant is a sovereign, a counterclaim ordinarily
is allowed on the theory that it is in reality a defense to the complainant's
action.2 The rationale of the defense of interpleader is that the stake-
holder thereby avoids the risk 13 of being vexed by two or more suits.14
The object of the defense is to have the conflicting claimants litigate the
matter among themselves, without involving the stakeholder in a contro-
versy with which he has no interest or concern.15 The litigation is limited
to the ownership of the subject matter of the suit.
Plaintiff's major contention in both courts was that the Red Chinese
claimants, as representatives of an unrecognized foreign government, had
no standing to sue and therefore could not be adverse claimants via in-
terpleader.16 Decision on this question was postponed until further proceed-
ings which would include the interpleaded parties, on the ground that
there was insufficient showing as to the true status of the adverse claim-
ants.17  If they are now found to be representatives of an unrecognized
10. See Dickinson, Waiver of State Immminty, 19 Amr. J. IN-'L L. 555, 556
(1925).
11. See Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 250 Fed.
341, 345 (2d Cir. 1918), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 663 (1918).
12. See Codification of International Law, supra note 5.
13. Cf. Petrogradsky M.K. Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 40
(1930): "The defendant does not and cannot interplead the Soviet Republic. That
being so, it must wage the battle for itself. Negligible is the risk that by any judg-
ment in its domicile it will be compelled to pay again. Whatever risk it runs abroad,
is one that it assumed as part of the business of the bank. The chance of double pay-
ment is a common risk of life."
14. 4 PomERoY, EQurry JUI5SPRUDExcE § 1320 (5th ed. 1941).
15. Ibid.
16. 195 F.2d at 234-35; 95 F. Supp. 740, 745.
17. The Department of State filed an affidavit with regard to United States
recognition of Nationalist China, 95 F. Supp. at 745. Previously, in a suit in the
New York courts, the Chase National Bank as depositary for the same bank sought
to interplead the same adverse claimants. The court held that Su Yu-nung as
representative of an unrecognized government had no standing, but a referee was
appointed to determine if the bank was a governmental agency or an independent
corporation. Chase National Bank v. Directorate General of Postal Remittances
and Savings Bank, 278 App. Div. 935, 105 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1st Dept. 1951).
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government, the court will no doubt hold that they have no standing
as claimants, and will award the contested fund to plaintiff, since suit on
behalf of a foreign state may be maintained only by the recognized govern-
ment.'8 Should Red China subsequently be recognized,19 the stakeholder
would not be further liable, since such recognition leaves unaffected the
legal consequences of recognition of the prior government insofar as
transactions with domestic nationals are concerned.20 If the adverse
claimants should be found to be private individuals, or a corporation in-
dependent of either Chinese government, they will have standing to
force a decision on the merits.21
It would seem that the court might have taken judicial notice of the
adverse claimants' status as representatives of an unrecognized govern-
ment. That it did not do so may have been due to a desire to postpone
final disposition of the fund pending further developments in the Far
East.22  At any rate, the status of the adverse claimants can best be ascer-
tained upon adequate hearing in which they are represented. Interpleader
will result in such a hearing.2
18. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario, 235 N.Y. 255, 139
N.E. 259 (1923).
19. The possibility of the claimants attaining a possible third status, a recognized
government, prior to the further proceedings is at best remote. Where the third
party claimant is a recognized sovereign, it may either rely on its immunity and
waive its claim to the subject matter or waive its immunity, relying on the knowledge
that an adverse decision would cost it no more of its immunity than would be
the case if it were to assert its claim by bringing suit. Interpleader merely forces
the sovereign to a decision which it might otherwise postpone for the period of the
statute of limitations, but protection of the stakeholder warrants this limited infringe-
ment of sovereign immunity.
20. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 140
(1938).
21. See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and Union Trust Co., 92 F. Supp.
920 (N.D. Cal. 1950), where the funds in question belonged to a Chinese corporation
and the court, infra note 23, acted to give "... protection to the Bank of China,
its stockholders, and depositors. .. ."
22. This may be indicative of a trend, since in two previous cases concerned
with conflicting claims caused by the current situation in China interlocutory orders
were made which also served to postpone final court decision as to the true owner.
See Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., .supra note 21 (trial of
cause continued sine die, defendant bank allowed either to deposit the fund in the
registry of the court or place the same in a separate trust account) ; Republic of China
v. Pang-Tsu Mow et al., 101 F. Supp. 646 (D.D.C. 1951) (disinterested person
appointed to take possession of the subject matter of the dispute so as to maintain
the status quo pending ultimate disposition of the case).
23. Where the depositary is plaintiff as in the Chase National Bank case, supra
note 17, both governments enter the case at the same time, and standing can be con-
tested by a motion to strike the appearance. Both parties are represented at that
hearing. Where one government is plaintiff a hearing where both are represented
can only be had by granting the motion to interplead, leaving standing to be de-
termined on the remand. This procedure has the merit of making it immaterial who
institutes the suit.
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Labor Law-
EMPLOYEE'S REFUSAL TO CROSS PICKET
LINE NOT PROTECTED ACTIVITY
An employee was discharged for refusal to obey his employer's orders
to perform that part of his regular daily duties which involved entering
another employer's plant which was being picketed by a union other than
the one to which the discharged employee belonged. The National Labor
Relations Board held that the employee had a right, guaranteed by § 7
of the Taft-Hartley Act,' to refuse to cross the picket line and that his
discharge was an unfair labor practice in violation of §§ 8(a) (1) and
(3) of that Act.2 Enforcement of the NLRB order reinstating the em-
ployee was refused. The court concluded that while an employee is free
to refuse to cross a picket line while on his own time, he may not refuse
to do so during his working time in violation of his employer's working
rules. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 3115 (U.S. Oct. 27, 1952).
The principal issue raised by this case is whether the employee's con-
duct is protected by § 7 of the Wagner Act.3 This section, continued un-
der the Taft-Hartley amendments, guarantees employees the right to assist
labor organizations and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of mutual aid and protection. In defining the extent of that right the
courts have held that discharging or demoting employees for refusal to
obey reasonable instructions of the employer pertaining to the employee's
duties was not an unfair labor practice.4 Accordingly there is a line of
authority that an employer may prohibit solicitation of union membership
by his employees during their working hours, but he may not prohibit
or punish solicitation on their own time.5 The present court reasons that
1. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1952) : "Employees shall have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection ..
2. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1948), as amended, 65 STAT.
601 (1951), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1952); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95
N.L.R.B. 336 (1951).
3. 49 STAT. 45Z (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1946).
4. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946) (upheld
discharge of employees refusing to process orders from a store where union em-
ployees were on strike); NLRB v. Columbia Products Co., 141 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1944) (employer could make and enforce rule forbidding employees to leave their
floor, but could not discriminate against union in enforcement) ; C. G. Conn Limited
v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939) (employee could be discharged for refusing
to work overtime). Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Am. Communication Ass'n.,
299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949) (no work stoppage clause in contract justifies
employer in discharging employee who would not handle messages from struck
company).
5. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945) (discharge of em-
ployee for union solicitation on own time held unfair labor practice, but employer's
right to prohibit union solicitation during working hours recognized); NLRB. v.
Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1946) (discharge of employee for
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if work orders can so restrict the employee's important right to solicit
membership in his own union, they may similarly restrict his right to
assist another union by honoring its picket line. The analogy is not en-
tirely appropriate since in contrast to solicitation the asserted privilege to
refuse to cross a picket line is one that is generally without significance
except during the employee's working hours. The only previous court
of appeals decision on the issue of the instant case also permitted the em-
ployer to discipline an employee who would not cross the picket line
of a union not his own,0 but the case arose before the Taft-Hartley Act.
The NLRB has consistently taken the view that an employee is privileged
to respect a picket line.
7
A second issue is raised because of the introduction in the Taft-Hartley
Act of § 8(b) (4). This subsection makes it an unfair labor practice for
a union or its agent to engage in secondary strikes, and adds: "Provided,
that nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlaw-
ful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer) [where a recognized union is on strike]." 8
The dissent in the present case finds in the spirit of the above proviso to
§ 8(b) (4) a sufficient basis for the board's decision. But the majority of
the court in this first judicial interpretation of the controversial proviso
construes it as only preventing an employee's individual refusal to cross the
picket line from being "regarded as a violation of the Act or as convicting
his union of an unfair labor practice." By this interpretation § 8(b) (4)
has no effect on an employee's right to assist labor organizations and en-
gage in concerted activities.9 Such a restriction of the effect of the proviso
finds support in the fact that the proviso is an addition to § 8(b) which
makes certain union activities unfair labor practices. The intent of Con-
gress must have been to prevent an individual's action from penalizing the
union; for if it had intended to give the employee some new protected rights
the proviso would have been placed in § 7.l There is nothing in the Act
union soliciation on own time held unfair labor practice, but prohibition of solicitation
during working hours upheld) ; NLRB v. American Pearl Button Co., 149 F.2d
258 (8th Cir. 1945) (employer's prohibiton of union activities on company property
during employee's time held unfair labor practices).
6. NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 342
U.S. 885 (1951) (upheld demotion of employees for refusal to cross picket line).
But cf. NLRB v. Montag Bros. Inc., 140 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1944) (reinstated union
leaders discriminatorily discharged for refusal to cross picket line).
7. See, e.g., Cyril de Cordova & Bro., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950); New York
Telephone Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 383 (1950).
8. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1952).
9. The Second and Seventh Circuits are apparently in disagreement as to whether
the conduct here in question is concerted activity or assistance to labor organizations
within the meaning of § 7 of the Act. Compare NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co.,
supra note 6 at 124, With instant case at 113. Since § 7 makes no reference to im-
mediate personal advantage the Second Circuit position appears sounder. See
NLRB v. Peter C. Kohler Co., 130 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1942).
10. The Legislative history is of little help. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1947) in NLRB, LEGrSLATrvE HisTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RmATioNS AcT 1947 429 (1948), in referring to the proviso, states: "In other words,
refusing to cross a picket line or otherwise refusing to engage in strike-breaking ac-
tivities would not be deemed an unfair labor practice unless the strike is a 'wildcat'
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which makes an employee's individual acts either an unfair practice or un-
lawful, and so the clause is actually unnecessary unless to protect the union
or to reaffirm the Act's inapplicability to the individual acts of an employee.1
To interpret the addition as intended to increase the effectiveness of
concerted activity is inconsistent if, as the court contends, any assistance
by any union to the employee in the present case in his one man strike
would be a secondary strike, an unfair labor practice under § 8(b) (4) .12
But since the discharged employee is willing to handle the picketed em-
ployer's product once it is through the line, a strike adopting this limited
purpose might be held not to be a § 8(b) (4) strike to force an employer
to cease dealing with another person, though that is its tendency. If the
discharge were an unfair labor practice the union could then strike to have
the discharged employee reinstated.
Union members habitually refuse to cross other union picket lines, and
thereby increase the picketing union's pressure on its employer.' 3 This
refusal to cross a picket line impedes the picketed employer's efforts to
resume operation by hiring replacements and consequently helps to protect
the jobs of economic strikers. The interest of a laborer who respects a
picket line is greatest where fellow workers or even outsiders picket to
organize his unorganized plant. In this situation § 7 will protect the worker
from employer retaliation. 14  The laborer's interest is less where a union
not his own pickets a different employer. The instant decision holds that
in the latter case an employee harming his employer by this attempted
assistance elects to take a risk similar to that assumed by an economic
striker.' 5 The fundamental policy question is the extent to which union
members' individual actions should be privileged in furthering objectives
of unions to which they do not belong. In the light of the secondary boy-
cott provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act and the desirability of localizing
the effects of strikes, this decision subordinates the solidarity of the labor
movement to the employee's duty to his employer in the absence of other
clear policy direction from the Act.
strike by a minority group." Tower, The Puzzling Proviso, 1 LABOR L.J. 1019
(1950), notes that the proviso comes from an earlier comprehensive labor bill intro-
duced by Senator Ball, S. 55, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(a) (1947). It would have
made certain labor union, employer or individual actions criminal offenses. Tower
suggests that the intent behind the proviso in the present Act was, "Probably un-
necessary but let's make sure."
11. The addition of the proviso as protection to unions is not surprising in view
of Title III of the Taft-Hartley Act which make unions more readily liable for
damages.
12. Instant case at 115; see Petro, Taft-Hartley and the Secondary Boycott, 1
LABOR LJ. 835 (1950). See note 15, infra.
13. See NLRB v. Denver Building Trades'Council, 341 U.S. 675, 687 (1951).
14. See Petro, Natiotal Labor Policy and Respect for Picket Lines, 3 LABOR
L.J. 83, 87 (1952) .
15. The Board contends that in the present case it was not proper to discharge
the employee without giving him the alternative of being treated as an economic
striker. The distinction is practically important only if it is assumed, as the Board
assumes, that the discharged employee's union and his fellow workers could come
to his assistance without committing a secondary strike. (N.L.R.B. PzvTION FOR
CERTioRAI, p. 19). See Witney, Reinstatement Rights of Strikers, 3 LABOR L.J.
89 (1952).
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Labor Law-
REFUSAL TO BARGAIN AS TO CONDITIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT NOT SPECIFIED IN CONTRACT
In 1948, respondent and the union executed a two year contract allow-
ing wage rate reopening in one year. After the first year the union re-
quested not only a wage increase, but also a pension plan, a subject not
previously mentioned in the contract nor discussed in the preceding nego-
tiations. The circuit court affirmed the NLRB's finding of an unfair labor
practice in respondent's refusal to bargain in good faith on pensions, hold-
ing that they were not a "term or condition contained in the contract" and
therefore not subject to the exemption provided in § 8(d) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.1 National Labor Relations Board v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196
F.2d 680 (id Cir. 1952).
Although the Wagner Act contained no provision dealing with the
question, the courts and the NLRB held prior to the Taft-Hartley Act that
the duty to bargain continued during the term of an agreement, even as
to terms expressed therein. 2 Section 8(d) of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments provides that there shall be no duty to discuss any modification of
the terms or conditions contained in a contract of fixed duration. This
case represents the initial court interpretation of that clause.3
Respondent contended that the effect of § 8(d) was to abolish the duty
of collective bargaining for the duration of the agreement, on the theory
that it is an implied condition of every such contract that both parties agree
to the maintenance of the major conditions of employment existing at its
execution.4 The legislative history is indecisive, if not contrary to this
thesis,5 and there is no clear preponderance of policy considerations on
either side. In reconciling the conflicts which must arise between the
Wagner Act's promotion of the collective bargaining process and regula-
tion of unions in the Taft-Hartley amendments, a common ground is found
1. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (Supp. 1952).
2. NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939); Alexander Milburn
Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 482 (1945) ; Carroll's Transfer Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 935 (1944).
3. In two cases the NLRB voiced the principle of this case when it was not
required by the facts. Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949); Tide Water
Associated Oil Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1949). See also, STEEL INDUsTRY BoARW,
REP. TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE LABOR DIsPuTE IN THE
BASIC STEEL IND. (1949), in which the fact finding board advised bargaining as to
terms not specified in the contract.
4. See Cox and Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the Terms
of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1116 (1950), for an excellent
articulation of respondent's argument. See Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214,
1228 (1951) (dissenting opinion).
5. A report of the house committee where this proviso originated supports the
respondent's theory, in I LEGISLATrvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-
TIONS Acr OF 1947 at 314 (1948). However, it was filed upon a clause worded more
broadly than the one finally adopted. Id. at 39. A senate committee report supports
the contrary view. It states that the notice clause in § 8(d) means that an employer
would be guilty of an unfair labor practice if he changed "any terms or conditions
specified in the contract" (emphasis supplied) after the contract had expired and
before the sixty day notice period had elapsed. Id. at 430. This proviso complements
the clause in question and so interpreted, gives weight to the conclusion that they
both govern only terms specified.
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in the legislative goal of promulgation of labor peace and uninterrupted
production. It may be argued that the decision in this case, by providing
the opportunity for bargaining during the term of the contract, will ag-
gravate normal human dissatisfaction and give rise to the necessity of con-
tinuing gains by union leaders to insure internal control, thus creating dis-
sention where none would otherwise exist. Contrary to this argument is
the fact that it is humanly impossible to anticipate all of the necessary con-
ditions of employment for the future, and that needs will arise whose denial
will cause antagonism, interfering with production during the contract and
seriously impeding negotiations upon its expiration. In addition, it was
contended that the NLRB ruling 'seriously reduces the predictability of
labor costs and therefore impedes efficiently planned operations. There is
no doubt that production planning would be greatly facilitated if all pos-
sible variables were rendered static for a fixed period, but this decision does
not preclude such a situation.7 The desired stability may be gained by
the inclusion of a status quo clause in the contract.8 This case merely
stands for the proposition that such an advantage to the employer requiring
a concession of employee rights, shall be bargained for explicitly, rather
than supplied by court action through implication. To that extent it is con-
sistent with the expressed legislative judgment that industrial peace can best
be maintained by insisting that conditions of employment be established
through collective bargaining.
Procedure-
EXCEPTION TO RES JUDICATA WHEN POLICY
BASIS OF RULE IS INAPPLICABLE
Vendor agreed to convey his farm to purchaser by warranty deed
joined by his wife. Upon refusal by the wife to join in the deed, pur-
chaser sued to specifically enforce the contract, requesting an abatement in
the purchase price by the value of the dower. Vendor counterclaimed
seeking to have the contract rescinded on the grounds of fraud, mistake and
lack of consideration and to be restored to possession.' It was held that
6. If both parties realized that the contract would establish the status quo for
all conditions of employment for its duration they would become overly cautious
concerning issues which had not fully developed at that time. This would increase
the difficulty of arriving at a satisfactory agreement.
7. The NLRB had held that a condition discussed in the negotiations for the
contract but not stipulated in the agreement itself is not subject to compulsory bar-
gaining during the term of the instrument. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214
(1951). Since this ruling was not in issue on appeal, the instant decision cannot be
assailed as allowing the union, subsequent to the signing of the contract, to force
negotiations on items previously traded off.
8. For an example of such a clause, see Contract Between Undted Auto Workers
of America and General Motors Corp., 26 LA. RE_. l MAN. 63, 91 (May-
Oct., 1950).
1. By the terms of the agreement purchaser went into possession upon execution
of the contract.
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the relief sought by purchaser was not available in Illinois 2 and the peti-
tion was dismissed. Vendor's counterclaim was also dismissed as without
substance. 3 Vendor then brought an action of ejectment against purchaser
who counterclaimed seeking specific performance in form of a deed not
joined by the wife. The court found the claim in ejectment based on the
same grounds as the counterclaim in the first action 4 and barred by res
judicata. Inasmuch as purchaser sought relief which he might have re-
quested in the first action, the court said that res judicata would normally
bar his action also. But in this "unique" situation, the court held that the
policies underlying res judicata 5 had no present application, and specific
performance was granted." Adams v. Pearson, 104 N.E.2d 267 (Ili. 1952).
On occasion, res judicata has led to absurd results, 7 or has imposed an
excessively severe penalty for an excusable oversight.8 Modern reform of
adjective law has elsewhere reduced the significance of procedural defects
which formerly would have been fatal to a meritorious claim. In many of
its applications res judicata has remained an intransigent exception to this
trend.9 However, an effort to lessen the harshness of the rule has resulted
in several exceptions. A second suit on the same cause of action is allowed
when plaintiff is excusably ignorant of the existence of a part of his cause
of action at the time of the first suit,10 or if part of the cause of action has
been overlooked due to a mistake as to the facts," or if fraud on the part
of defendant has concealed part of plaintiff's cause of action.' 2 The de-
2. The court admitted that such relief was common in other jurisdictions, but
held it was against public policy in Illinois to evaluate so speculative a thing as an
inchoate dower interest.
3. Pearson v. Adams, 394 Ill. 391, 68 N.E.2d 777 (1947).
4. These were fraud, mistake, lack of consideration and refusal by purchaser to
accept a deed not joined by the wife.
5. It is generally stated that res judicata is based on a public policy which de-
mands an end to litigation, both to relieve defendants of the expense of repeated
litigation and to economize court time. Additional reasons advanced are the avoid-
ance of double recovery and the promotion of the stability of judicial decision. See
von Moschzisker, Res Judicata, 38 YA.E L.J. 299 (1928) ; Cleary, Res J.udicata Re-
examined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
6. The court does not mention the price to be paid, but it would seem that,
since an abatement had been refused in the first suit, purchaser would have to pay
full purchase price. See Ebert v. Arends, 190 Ill. 221, 60 N.E. 211 (1901).
7. See Cleary, Res Judicata Re-exainiwd, 57 YAix L.J. 339 (1948). As ex-
amples Professor Cleary cites Farrington v. Payne, 15 Johns 432 (N.Y. 1818)
(defendant may continue to sleep in plaintiff's bed, although not under plaintiff's
bed-quilts) ; Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901) (defendant may con-
tinue to occupy plaintiff's real estate although plaintiff has a judgment awarding him
possession).
8. See, e.g., Kline v. Stein, 46 Wash. 546, 90 Pac. 1041 (1908).
9. The argument is made that the possible mischief flowing from a precedent
relaxing the strict rule of res judicata outweighs the benefit from relief of individual
hardship. For this argument in a slightly different context, see Reed v. Allen, 286
U.S. 191, 199 (1932).
10. See, e.g., Boos v. Claude, 69 S.D. 254, 9 N.W.2d 262 (1943); McVay v.
Castenara, 152 Miss. 106, 119 So. 135 (1928).
11. See, e.g., It re Oakdale Building Corp., 28 F. Supp. 63 (N.D. Ill. 1939);
Albough v. Osborne-McMillan Elevator Co., 53 N.D. 113, 205 N.W. 5 (1925).
12. See, e.g., Jackson v Mutual Beneficial Health and Accident Association, 73
N.D. 108, 11 N.W.2d 442 (1943); White v. Miley, 137 Wash. 80, 241 Pac. 670
(1925). The fraud in the res judicata exception may be regarded as setting aside
so much of the former judgment as bars the omitted claim, but it should be noted
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velopment of this relief is perhaps partially attributable to the expanded
conception of the cause of action which gives greater opportunity for costly
omission than existed at common law,1 3 but relief has also been granted
where some element of damages has been omitted from what would have
been a single common law cause of action.' 4 More recently, in a few addi-
tional instances where res judicata would normally apply and where the
case does not fit into any of these exceptions, the courts have refused to
apply res judicata, either on the grounds that the policy underlying the
doctrine would not be served 15 or that the result would be unjust.:6
The instant case provides an excellent example of this last situation.
With res judicata enforced, vendor is left with no remedy to recover pos-
session. To recover on the contract vendor would have to show substantial
performance, a difficult matter in face of his inability to deliver an unen-
cumbered deed. An action by the vendor for restitution on a theory of
unjust enrichment would probably succeed in jurisdictions without com-
pulsory counterclaims.17 Yet if vendor recovered the value of the benefit
conferred, the result would be to give purchaser what he was refused in the
first suit, and substantially what he had sought in the second, but at the
cost of a third action. Such a result would hardly serve the objective of
res judicata. If the action failed, vendor would be deprived of his land
with only the down payment for remuneration.
While exceptions to res judicata seem desirable as a means of avoid-
ing foolish or unjust results they are not easily encompassed by a precise
rule. The futility of any attempt to set forth a rule which would embrace
the instant case and still be generally applicable illustrates the point. Fur-
that this is not ordinarily the intrinsic fraud necessary to collaterally attack a judg-
ment.
13. See Williamson v. Columbia Gas and Electric Co., 186 F.2d 464, 469 (3d
Cir. 1950): "A reading of the early cases as compared with recent ones makes it
clear that the meaning of cause of action for res judicata purposes is much broader
today than it was earlier. . . . [Formerly] if the theory of the second suit was
unavailable under the writ used in the first suit, the plaintiff had no opportunity
to litigate it there and so plaintiff was not barred by res judicata. The force of the
rule is still operative but the scope of its operation has been greatly limited by the
modernization of our procedure. . . . [Under modern procedure] the whole con-
troversy between the parties may and often must be brought before the same court
in the same action." For instances where the omission barred by res judicata might
have been a separate cause of action at common law see White v. Miley, supra note
12; Boos v. Claude, supra note 10.
14. For omission of an element of damages see Jackson v. Mutual Beneficial
Health and Accident Association, supra note 12; Albough v. Osborne-McMillan
Elevator Co., supra note 11.
15. State ex rel. White Pine Sash Co. v. Superior Court for Ferry County, 145
Wash. 249, 261 Pac. 110 (1927); Howell v. State Bank, 149 Wash. 249, 270 Pac.
831 (1928) ; White v. Adler, 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.2d 798 (1942).
16. Guardianship of DiCarlo, 3 Cal.2d 225, 44 P.2d 562 (1935); Greenfield v.
Mather, 32 Cal.2d 23, 194 P.2d 1 (1948).
17. On the right to restitution in favor of a plaintiff in default see 5 CoRMN,
CoTRaAcrs ff 1122-1135 (1951); RESTA.ENT, CoNTRAcrs § 357 (1932). Illinois
has no compulsory counterclaim statute, but in a state which did, the vendor could
have joined a counterclaim for restitution in the alternative in the first suit, and
it is arguable that he would now be barred by his failure to do so. But see Purkisser
v. Folgar, 11 Cal. App.2d 144, 52 P.2d 1004 (1936), where that argument was re-
jected.
19521
300 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
thermore, any such rule would only serve to contract the scope of res
judicata without relieving the rigidity which characterizes its present opera-
tion. Although exceptions such as the one made in the instant case are
rare, counsel will be well advised in a comparable situation to consider the
possibility of a frontal attack on res judicata where subservience to the rule
will not serve its ends.
Taxation-
NON-RESIDENT SERVICEMAN'S PERSONALTY
TAXABLE DESPITE RELIEF ACT
The city of Denver levied a tax upon the personal property in the Den-
ver apartment of an Air Force officer stationed in Colorado. He paid the
tax under protest and subsequently filed suit to recover the amount paid 1
on the ground that, by virtue of § 514 of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil
Relief Act of 1940,2 neither he nor his personal property acquired domicile
or location in Colorado for purposes of taxation. The trial court ren-
dered judgment for the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Colorado re-
versed the judgment, holding that § 514 was only intended to prevent
multiple taxation. Since plaintiff's personal property was not taxed by
Louisiana, the state of his domicile prior to military service, there was no
multiple taxation, and therefore this tax was valid. Cass v. Danwron, 244
P.2d 1082 (Colo. 1952), cert. granted sub nom. Dameron v. Brodhead,
21 U.S.L. WEEK 3145 (U.S. Nov. 24, 1952).
Section 514 of the Act provides that for purposes of taxation no per-
son, his personal property, income, or gross income shall be deemed to have
gained or lost a residence or domicile solely because the person or his prop-
erty is within the state by reason of and in compliance with military orders.
The section specifically provides that "... personal property shall not
be deemed to be located or present in or have a situs for taxation in such
State . . ." 8 Most writers in discussing the Act have merely stated that
a state could not tax the personal property of a serviceman who was within
the state's jurisdiction by reason of and in compliance with military orders.
4
As recently as October, 1948, the Attorney General of Colorado, rendered a
carefully worded opinion to that apparent effect.3 The instant case, how-
l. The amount of the tax involved is $23.51. From this and other surrounding
circumstances it appears that this is a test case to determine the scope of the tax
relief granted by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.
2. 56 STAT. 777 (1942), as amended 58 STAT. 722 (1944), 50 U.S.C. ApP. § 574
(1946).
3. Ibid.
4. Comments, 12 FoRD. L. REv. 153, 170 (1943); 11 KAN. CITY L. REv. 137,
144 (1943); 27 MARQ. L. REv. 59, 65 (1943); 42 MIcH. L. REv. 480, 505 (1943)
("The justice of such restriction is obvious.") ; 21 NEB. L. REv. 390 (1942) ("Local
taxation of military personel serving in various states, counties, or municipalities
where they do not regularly reside is also prohibited as to income and personal
property.").
5. BIENNIAL REP. ATr'y. GEN., CoLo., 1947-48, at 147. (A serviceman's person
or property is not deemed to be domiciled or located within the state when there by
reason of military orders).
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ever, found that the intent of Congress was only to prevent multiple taxa-
tion. That this was one of the main objects of this section cannot be
doubted.0 It appears, however, that to secure this protection for service-
men Congress intended that only the state in which the servicemen were
domiciled prior to their military service sh6uld retain the right 7 to impose
taxes upon them and their personal property.8
At a hearing before the House Military Affairs Committee,9 although
little consideration was given to § 514, the statement was made that: "The
first proviso of this section . . . saves the right of such taxation to the
state in which such person was legally domiciled or residenced immediately
prior to the period of military service." 10 None of the committee members
questioned or objected to this statement at the time."' That this is the
intent of Congress becomes clear when the possible consequences of the
present decision are considered. The Colorado Court's view that the Act
only prevents the imposition of more than one personal property tax means
that every member of the armed forces who is legally domiciled in a state
which has no personal property tax would be subject to tax on his per-
sonalty in Colorado, even though the serviceman's state of domicile may
have imposed other taxes instead of a personal property tax. A second
consequence is that the Act would exempt only those servicemen who are
from states which not only have personal property taxes but also have
imposed such taxes upon servicemen.' 2 Finally, this interpretation of the
Act would also lead to the result that if the serviceman's state of domicile
levied a personal property tax upon certain classifications of personal
property but not upon others, then all classifications not taxed by that state
could be taxed by Colorado. These possible results raise serious doubts
as to the validity of the Colorado Court's interpretation of the congressional
6. H.R. REP. No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 6 (1942); Hearings before Coi-
nittee on Military Affairs on H.R. 7029, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 28 (1942); H.R.
RaP. No. 1514, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1944).
7. The court in the instant case at 1084 placed significance upon the fact that
no reference is made to granting an exemption either in the act or the legislative
history. Under the interpretation suggested the reason that no reference is made as
to granting an exemption becomes clear. Congress did not intend to grant an ex-
emption to taxation for the servicemen, but only intended to prevent other states
from imposing taxes upon them and their personalty.
8. Provision is made in the section to exclude income and property from pro-
tection under the act which is used within the state for business purposes, and also
if the serviceman has established domicile and residence within another state after
entering military service.
9. Hearing before Committee on Military Affairs on H.R. 7029, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess. (1942).
10.-Supra note 9, at 28. This statement was made by Major Partlow, of the
Judge Advocate General's office, who was the advisor to the sub-committee of the
House Military Affairs Committee which drafted the amendment adding § 514 to the
Act, and who assisted the sub-committee in drafting the amendment.
11. Ibid. The 1942 amendment which was before the committee at this hearing
was subsequently re-phrased without modification of the purposes of the Act. The
1944 amendment was to clarify the scope of the 1942 amendment and specifically in-
clude personal property within the scope of § 514.
12. If a serviceman's state of domicile granted all of its servicemen an exemp-
tion from personal property taxes, would they be liable for Colorado's personal
property tax? There would be no "multiple taxation" of the personal property.
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intent in promulgating § 514, particularly in the light of Congress' mandate
that ". . . Any doubts that may arise as to the scope and application of
the act should be resolved in favor of the person in military service . ." 13
This decision provides Colorado with a new and readily acceptable
source of tax income wherever military installations are located within its
jurisdiction. If the decision is upheld local taxing units will seriously re-
consider the possibility of exploiting this source of tax revenue, which
heretofore they apparently have considered not subject to their taxing
power. To the extent that this decision gives states an incentive to pass
statutes taxing the personalty of servicemen, or to extend their present
statutes to tax the personalty of servicemen, its consequences are dia-
metrically opposed to the Congressional intent expressed in the Act.
Taxation-
PRESENT ACTUARIAL VALUE OF CONTINGENT
REMAINDER TO CHARITY DEDUCTIBLE FROM
GROSS ESTATE
Testator's will left the estate in trust for his wife and daughter for
their joint lives and for the life of the survivor, remainder in equal shares
to the descendants of the daughter; but if there were none, one-half to
certain collateral relatives and one-half to a named charity. The Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue denied deduction for the contingent re-
mainder to charity claimed under Internal Revenue Code § 812(d). The
Tax Court reasoned that the present value of the contingent remainder
to charity can be ascertained by reliable actuarial reckoning of the termina-
tion of the life estate and the statistical probability that the daughter, aged
27, would have a child. It accordingly allowed a deduction of the present
value, so computed, from the value of the gross estate. Louis Sternberger,
18 T.C. No. 103 (July 31, 1952).
While the use of actuarial data to calculate the present value of vested
future interests has been accepted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,'
deductions for contingent remainders to charity are expressly denied by
Treasury Regulation § 81.46 "unless the possibility that charity will not
take is so remote as to be negligible." Before 1942, the year in which
this formulation appeared, the courts, following Humes v. United Statess
struck down deductions based on contingent remainders to charity on
the ground that Congress, in providing for such deductions, 4 did not intend
13. H.R. REP. No. 2198, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 (1944). The Supreme Court
of the United States has upheld this congressional mandate. Le Maistre v. Leffers,
333 U.S. 1 (1948); Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, rehearing denied 320 U.S.
809 (1943).
1. U.S. TRaAs. REG. 105, § 81.44 (1944). This regulation was taken from U.S.
TREAS. Ra. 80, ART. 44 (1937) with slight modifications. Ithaca Trust Co. v. United
States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929) ; Simpson v. United States, 252 U.S. 547 (1920).
2. U.S. TRaAs. REG. 105, § 81A6 (1942).
3. 276 U.S. 487 (1928).
4. Revenue Act of 1918, c. 18, § 403 (a) (3), 40 STAT. 1057, 1098, now INT. Ry.
CoDE §812(d).
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that they should be allowed for contingencies of a value which could only be
guessed at "even with all the aid the actuarial art can supply." 5 Excep-
tions were made only when a contingent remainder was certain to vest in
a charity.6 The instant case does find support, however, in Meierhof v.
Higgins,7 a Second Circuit decision of 1942, which asserted that the right
of deduction depended solely on whether the remainder had an ascertainable
market value, not on whether it was contingent or vested. The court
distinguished the Huws case as based on the inferior quality of the ac-
tuarial data then available.8 The Meierhof case has since been criticized 9
as a doubtful interpretation of the then existing regulations.Y0 Subsequent
cases 11 have adopted the present § 81.46 requirement 12 of near certainty.
The court in the instant case ignored § 81.46, with which its decision
is clearly inconsistent. Treasury regulations serve a necessary adminis-
trative function,' 3 and must be adhered to unless unreasonable and plainly
inconsistent with the revenue statutes.'4 The Treasury position is that
special deductions are justifiable only for those sufficiently interested in
charity to leave a bequest almost certain to vest. The statute, however,
authorizes exemptions for all bequests to charity without distinguishing
5. Humes v. United States, 276 U.S. 487 (1928); Hoagland v. Kavanaugh,
36 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich. 1941); City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United
States, 5 F. Supp. 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). See U.S. TREAs. REG. 37, Art. 56:
"Where the bequest, legacy, devise or gift is dependent upon the performance of some
act, or the happening of some event, in order to become effective it is necessary
that the performance of the act or the occurrence of the event shall have taken
place before the deduction can be allowed. Where by the terms of the bequest,
devise or gift, it is subject to be defeated by a subsequent act or event, no deduction
will be allowed."
6. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934). Contra:
Guaranty Trust Co. v. C.I.R., 27 B.T.A. 550 (1933). But cf. Hoagland v. Kava-
naugh, 36 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
7. 129 F.2d 1002 (2d Cir. 1942). The case arose prior to U.S. TREAs. REG.
105, § 81.46 (1942).
8. In the Humes case, 276 U.S. 487 (1928), Justice Brandeis held statistics of
the Scottish peerage inapplicable to a Texas girl.
9. Newton Trust v. C.I.R., 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947) ; PAuL, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND Grv TAXATION 426 (Supp. 1946). See Merchants National Bank v. C.I.R.,
320 U.S. 256 (1934) where, in holding that the power to invade the corpus in the
discretion of the trustees made the bequest to charity too uncertain to be deductible,
the Court, citing the Hemes case, used language susceptible to the interpretation
that the use of actuarial data to evaluate a bequest was permissible only in the case
of a remainder certain to vest, but that case is distinguishable from the instant case.
The power to invade as opposed to the probability of bearing children is hardly
susceptible of statistical evaluation. Of necessity then, the petitioner in the
Merchants case failed to carry the burden of proof as to the value of the deduction.
Cf. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
10. Judge A. Hand's interpretation was that U.S. TREAs. REG. 37, ART. 44, now
U.S. TREAs. REG. 105, §81.44 (1944), modified ART. 56, smpra note 5, and that there-
fore the partial deduction allowed for "a trust created for both a charitable and a
private purpose" could disjunctively be extended to contingent charitable remainders
as well as vested charitable remainders after life estates.
11. Newton Trust v. C.I.R., .rpra; Graff v. Smith, 100 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Pa.
1951), cf. Gardiner v Hassett, 63 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1945). These cases
were not cited by the Commissioner's brief in the instant case.
12. See text at note 2 supra.
13. See Eisenstein, Some Iconoclastic Reflections on T x Administration, 58
HARv. L. REv. 477 (1945).
14. C.I.R. v. South Texas Co., 333 U.S 496 (1948).
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between vested and contingent gifts.' 5 Unless this is read to mean all gifts
in fact going to charity, if the probabilities of vesting are susceptable of ac-
curate acturial prediction, the Treasury regulation, though supported by
language in the cases, is inconsistent with legislative intent.
As the science of statistics has advanced, first the courts i6 and then
the Treasury 17 have accepted remarriage tables for widows, despite the
volitional character of marriage, for the purpose of establishing the value
of payments to a testator's divorced wife, which could be deducted from
testator's gross estate. Moreover, the government has had remarriage
tables prepared for use in the Social Security program.'5 In light of the
acceptance of such tables in those areas, there is no reason why their
accuracy should be challenged in this situation.19 If the figures provided
are accurate, then the fractional deduction allowed for each contingent
bequest will reflect the total percentage of occasions when the remainder
will actually vest. Therefore, the taxes collected on the basis of the tables,
though less than those presently collected, will in the long run closely
approximate the amount that would be collected if it were known at the
time of testator's death whether or not the contingent bequest would vest.
The possibility of abuse of this deduction.in estate planning must be
recognized, however. Though the testator could control the probabilities
in only a limited number of cases, he is often aware of specific information
which may be expected to lead to a variance from the average of the tables.
2 0
Gifts to charity which are never expected to vest may be tacked on solely
for their deduction value. But the inability to predict accurately another
person's emotionally motivated conduct, the difficulty of comparing such a
speculative prediction with the probability expressed in the applicable table,
the irremovable remaining chance of vesting in charity against a testator's
wishes, and the usual intertia in changing wills are all factors lessening the
chances of abuse. Probability tables would, therefore, be quite accurate
in most simple situations, such as those where the spans of two lives or the
marriage of very young or aged persons are involved.2 1 While the types
of contingencies for which probability tables could be established are mani-
fold, the use of such tables should be limited to calculations prepared from
tables published by recognized actuarial organizations 22 in order to provide
impartial, accurate and accessible statistics.
15. Gardiner v. Hassett, 63 F. Supp. 853 (D. Mass. 1945).
16. C.I.R. v. Maresi, 156 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1946); C.I.R. v. State Street.Trust,
128 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1942).
17. E.T. 19, 1946-2 Cum. BuuL. 169.
18. 38 THE REcoRD 189, 192 (Am. Inst. of Actuaries 1949).
19. In the instant case the calculations by one actuarial firm were vouched for
by a second actuary. [Record, p. 33.]. In contrast the Treasury's zeal for accuracy
is illustrated by the fact that the Combined Experience Mortality. Table published
by the Treasury for use until this year is based on data gathered in Great Britain
from 1762 to 1833. Table A, U.S. TREAs. Rz. 105, § 81.10 (1942). See WILLEY,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTISE OF LiFE INsURANcE 42 (7th ed. 1906).
20. Where the contingency consists of the marriage of a life tenant who was
engaged at testator's death, the deduction could be refused, as is the use of mortality
tables to estimate the life expectancy of a mortally ill individual. Nicholas M. Butler,
18 T.C. No. 117 (August 27, 1952); John H. Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387 (1946).
21. See Newton Trust v. C.I.R., 160 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1947).
22. E.g., the Society of Actuaries or the Casualty Actuarial Society.
